This paper shows that if a game satisfies the sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium provided by Rosen (1965) then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium, which places probability one on the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, it shows that a weaker condition suffices for the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium. The condition generalizes the sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium provided by Neyman (1997) for a potential game with a strictly concave potential function. JEL classification: C72.
Introduction
This paper explores conditions for uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974 (Aumann, , 1987 in a class of games where strategy sets are finite-dimensional convex sets and each player's payoff function is concave and continuously differentiable with respect to the player's own strategy. Liu (1996) showed that a Cournot oligopoly game with a linear demand function has a unique correlated equilibrium. Neyman (1997) studied a correlated equilibrium of a potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) and showed that if a potential function is concave and payoff functions are bounded then any correlated equilibrium is a mixture of potential maximizers in Theorem 1 and that if a potential function is strictly concave and strategy sets are compact then the potential game has a unique correlated equilibrium, which places probability one on the unique potential maximizer, in Theorem 2. The latter, which is derived from the former, generalizes the result of Liu (1996) because a Cournot oligopoly game with a linear demand function is a potential game with a strictly concave potential function (Slade, 1994) .
We study a correlated equilibrium of a class of games examined by Rosen (1965) . For a given game, consider a vector each component of which is a partial derivative of each player's payoff function with respect to the player's own strategy and call it the payoff gradient of the game. The payoff gradient is said to be strictly monotone if the inner product of a difference of arbitrary two strategy profiles and the corresponding difference of the payoff gradient is strictly negative. Strict monotonicity of the payoff gradient implies strict concavity of each player's payoff function with respect to the player's own strategy. Theorem 2 of Rosen (1965) showed that if the payoff gradient is strictly monotone and strategy sets are compact then the game has a unique purestrategy Nash equilibrium. The present paper shows that, under the same condition, the game has a unique correlated equilibrium, which places probability one on the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, our main result (Proposition 5) shows that a weaker condition suffices for the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium. This result generalizes Theorem 2 of Neyman (1997) because the payoff gradient of a potential game with a strictly concave potential function is strictly monotone.
To establish the main result, we first provide a sufficient condition for any correlated equilibrium to be a mixture of pure-strategy Nash equilibria, which differs from but overlaps with Theorem 1 of Neyman (1997) . We then show that if the payoff gradient is strictly monotone and strategy sets are compact then the game satisfies the sufficient condition and thus any correlated equilibrium must place probability one on the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Preliminary definitions and results are summarized in section 2. The concept of strict monotonicity for the payoff gradient is introduced in section 3. The results are reported in section 4.
Preliminaries
A game consists of a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a measurable set of strategies X i ⊆ R m i for i ∈ N with a generic element x i = (x i1 , . . . , x im i ) , and a measurable payoff function u i : X → R for i ∈ N where X = ∏ i∈N X i . It is assumed that X i is a fulldimensional convex subset 1 of an Euclidean space R m i . We write
We will fix N and X throughout this paper and simply denote a game by u = (u i ) i∈N .
A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of u is a strategy profile x * ∈ X such that, for all
A correlated equilibrium 2 of u is a probability distribution µ over X such that, for each i ∈ N and any measurable function ξ i :
A game u is a smooth game if, for each i ∈ N , u i (x) has continuous partial derivatives with respect to the components of x i . In a smooth game u, the first-order condition for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
where
The problem of solving this type of an inequality is called the variational inequality problem 3 and the following sufficient condition for the existence of a solution is wellknown. 4
Lemma 1 Let u be a smooth game. If X i is compact for all i ∈ N then there exists x * ∈ X satisfying (2).
A game u is a concave game (Rosen, 1965) if, for each i ∈ N , u i (x) is concave in x i for every fixed x −i ∈ X −i . It can be readily shown that if u is a smooth concave game then the first-order condition (1) is necessary and sufficient for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and thus the set of solutions to the inequality problem (2) coincides with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. 5 A game u is a potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) if there exists a potential function f :
, and i ∈ N . As shown by Monderer and Shapley (1996) , a smooth game u is a potential game with a potential function f if and only if ∇ i u i = ∇ i f for all i ∈ N . This implies that the first-order condition for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and that for a potential maximizer x * ∈ arg max x∈X f (x) coincide. From the equivalence of the two first-order conditions, we can derive the following lemma, which Neyman (1997) 
It has been shown that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is a solution to the variational inequality problem with F = (−∇iui)i∈N (cf. Hartman and Stampacchia, 1966; Gabay and Moulin, 1980) . 4 See Nagurney (1993), for example. 5 Accordingly, a smooth concave game with compact strategy sets has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium by Lemma 1, whereas Kakutani fixed point theorem directly shows that a concave game with compact strategy sets, which is not necessarily a smooth game, has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if
the latter of which is derived from the former. Neyman (1997) 
Strict monotonicity of the payoff gradient
Let S ⊆ R m be a convex set and let F : S → R m be a mapping. A mapping F is said to be strictly monotone if (F (x) − F (y)) (x − y) > 0 for all x, y ∈ S with x = y. The following sufficient condition for strict monotonicity is well-known. 7
Lemma 3 If a mapping F : S → R m is continuously differentiable and the Jacobian matrix of F is positive definite for all x ∈ S then F is strictly monotone.
Let us call (∇ i u i ) i∈N the payoff gradient of a smooth game u. We say that, with some abuse of language, the payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone if a mapping
Let c i ∈ R ++ be a constant for each i ∈ N and call (c i ∇ i u i ) i∈N the c-weighted payoff gradient of u where c = (c i ) i∈N . We say that the c-weighted payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone if a mapping
Note that if c i = c j for all i, j ∈ N then (4) implies (3).
7 See Nagurney (1993), for example. 8 Rosen (1965) called this property "diagonal strict concavity."
Let γ i : X i → R ++ be a function for each i ∈ N and call (γ i ∇ i u i ) i∈N the γ-weighted payoff gradient of u where γ = (γ i ) i∈N . We say that the γ-weighted payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone if a mapping
Note that if γ i (x i ) = c i ∈ R ++ for all x i ∈ X i and i ∈ N then (5) implies (4). Rosen (1965) showed that strict monotonicity of the c-weighted payoff gradient leads to the uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Let u be a smooth game with compact strategy sets. If there exists a constant c i ∈ R ++ for each i ∈ N such that the c-weighted payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone then u has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Especially, if the payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone then u has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
In the next section, we shall show that strict monotonicity of the γ-weighted payoff gradient leads to the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium.
Before closing this section, we discuss two implications of strict monotonicity. 9 In a smooth potential game, strict monotonicity of the payoff gradient is equivalent to strict concavity of a potential function.
Lemma 4 Let u be a smooth potential game. A potential function of u is strictly concave if and only if the payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone.
Proof. Let f be a potential function and suppose that f is strictly concave. For x = y,
, which implies that the payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone. Conversely, suppose that the payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone. Fix x, y ∈ X with x = y. Let φ(t) = f (x + t(y − x)) for t ∈ [0, 1]. Then, φ is differentiable and, by the mean-value theorem, there exist 0
On the other hand, since the payoff gradient is strictly monotone,
This inequality, (6), and (7) imply that f ((x + y)/2) > (f (x) + f (y))/2. Therefore, f must be strictly concave by the continuity of f .
In a smooth game, strict monotonicity of the c-weighted payoff gradient implies strict concavity of each player's payoff function with respect to the player's own strategy. Proof. Fix arbitrary i ∈ N and x −i ∈ X −i and consider a game with a singleton player set {i}, a strategy set X i , and a payoff function u i (·, x −i ) : X i → R. This game is trivially a potential game with a potential function u i (·, x −i ). Note that the payoff gradient of this game is strictly monotone. Thus, the potential function is strictly concave by Lemma 4. This implies that u i (x) is strictly concave in x i .
Results
We provide a sufficient condition for any correlated equilibrium to be a mixture of purestrategy Nash equilibria.
Proposition 4 Let u be a smooth game with bounded payoff functions. Assume that there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X and a bounded measurable function γ i : X i → R ++ for each i ∈ N such that:
Then, any correlated equilibrium of u is a mixture of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Proof. Let µ be a probability distribution over X such that µ(Y ) > 0 for some measurable set Y ⊆ X containing no pure-strategy Nash equilibria. It is enough to show that µ is not a correlated equilibrium.
Therefore, there exists t > 0 such that
For a measurable function f : X → R, let E µ(x) [f (x)|x i ] denote the conditional expected value of f (x) given x i ∈ X i with respect to µ. Define a measurable set
and write 1 S i : X i → {0, 1} for its indicator function.
This and (8) imply that
and thus µ is not a correlated equilibrium, which completes the proof.
As the next lemma shows, a smooth potential game with bounded payoff functions satisfies the sufficient condition for any correlated equilibrium to be a mixture of purestrategy Nash equilibria given by Proposition 4 if its potential function is concave and a potential maximizer exists. On the other hand, Proposition 1 does not assume the existence of a potential maximizer a priori: it asserts that if a correlated equilibrium exists then a potential maximizer also exists and any correlated equilibrium is a mixture of potential maximizers, i.e., pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In this sense, Proposition 4 with the following lemma partially explains Proposition 1.
Lemma 6 Let u be a smooth potential game with bounded payoff functions. If a potential function of u is concave and a potential maximizer exists then, for a potential maximizer
x * ∈ X and γ i : X i → R ++ with γ i (x i ) = 1 for all x i ∈ X i and i ∈ N , the conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 4 are true.
Proof. Let f be a potential function and write X * = arg max x∈X f (x), which is nonempty by the assumption and coincides with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria by Lemma 2. Let x * ∈ X * . Then,
since u i is bounded, which establishes (ii).
Using Proposition 4, we show that strict monotonicity of the γ-weighted payoff gradient leads to the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Let u be a smooth game with compact strategy sets. If there exists a bounded measurable function γ i : X i → R ++ for each i ∈ N such that the γ-weighed
payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone then u has a unique correlated equilibrium, which places probability one on a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Especially, if the payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone then u has a unique correlated equilibrium.
Proposition 5 generalizes Proposition 2 because, by Lemma 4, the payoff gradient of a smooth potential game with a strictly concave potential function is strictly monotone. Proposition 5 also generalizes Proposition 3 because the c-weighted payoff gradient is a special case of the γ-weighted payoff gradient.
To prove Proposition 5, we first show the existence 10 and uniqueness of a purestrategy Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 7 Let u be a smooth game with compact strategy sets. If there exists a function
that the γ-weighed payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone then u has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. First, we show that u has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. By Lemma 1, there exists x * ∈ X satisfying (2), which is equivalent to (1). Thus, it is enough to show that x * is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Fix i ∈ N and x i = x * i . By strict monotonicity, we have
. Hence, by (1),
, which implies that x * is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium because x i ∈ X i and i ∈ N are chosen arbitrarily.
Next, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is unique. Let x * , y * ∈ X be two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. By (1), it holds that
By adding them and taking a sum over i ∈ N , we have
Thus, x * and y * must coincide, which completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 5. We show that u satisfies the sufficient condition for any correlated equilibrium to be a mixture of pure-strategy Nash equilibria given by Proposition 4. By Lemma 7, u has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X. For any
by strict monotonicity and thus
by (1), which establishes (i).
Fix i ∈ N . By the mean-value theorem, for any x ∈ X and t ∈ (0, 1], there exists
since X is compact and ∇ i u i is continuous, which establishes (ii). Therefore, by Proposition 4, any correlated equilibrium of u must place probability one on the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium x * , which completes the proof.
Using Lemma 3, we can obtain a sufficient condition for strict monotonicity of the γ-weighed payoff gradient which is in some cases easier to verify than (5) if payoff functions are twice continuously differentiable. By considering a special case with X i ⊆ R for all i ∈ N , we have the following corollary of Proposition 5.
Corollary 6 Let u be a smooth game. Suppose that X i ⊆ R is a closed bounded interval for all i ∈ N and that payoff functions are twice continuously differentiable. If there exists a continuously differentiable function
is negative definite for all x ∈ X where δ ij is the Kronecker delta then u has a unique correlated equilibrium, which places probability one on a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Especially, if a matrix [∂ 2 u i (x)/∂x i ∂x j ] is negative definite for all x ∈ X then u has a unique correlated equilibrium. (9) is the Jacobian matrix multiplied by −1. Thus, if (9) is negative definite for all x ∈ X then the mapping is strictly monotone by Lemma 3. This implies that the γ-weighted payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone, which completes the proof by Proposition 5.
As shown by Monderer and Shapley (1996) , if the matrix [∂ 2 u i (x)/∂x i ∂x j ] is symmetric for all x ∈ X then u is a potential game and [∂ 2 u i (x)/∂x i ∂x j ] coincides with the Hessian matrix of a potential function. Thus, if [∂ 2 u i (x)/∂x i ∂x j ] is symmetric and negative definite for all x ∈ X then u is a smooth potential game with a strictly concave potential function and thus a correlated equilibrium of u is unique by Proposition 2. Corollary 6 says that [∂ 2 u i (x)/∂x i ∂x j ] needs not be symmetric for the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium.
Finally, we discuss two examples.
Example 1 Consider a Cournot oligopoly game with differentiated products in which a strategy of firm i ∈ N is a quantity of differentiated product i ∈ N to produce. So let X i ⊆ R + be a closed bounded interval for all i ∈ N . An inverse demand function for product i is denoted by p i : X → R + and a cost function of firm i is denoted by c i :
It is assumed that both of them are twice continuously differentiable and
The matrix (9) is calculated as
.
is negative definite for all x ∈ X then u has a unique correlated equilibrium by Corollary 6 since a matrix
is positive semidefinite for all x ∈ X. As a special case, consider a linear inverse demand func-
is negative definite then u has a unique correlated equilibrium. Note that if [(1 + δ ij )a ij ] is symmetric, i.e., a ij = a ji for all i, j ∈ N , then [∂ 2 u i (x)/∂x i ∂x j ] is symmetric and thus u is a potential game.
Example 2 Let X i ⊆ R be a closed bounded interval for all i ∈ N and let u be a smooth game such that the payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone. Consider another game v = (v i ) i∈N such that, for all x ∈ X and i ∈ N ,
where w i : X i → R ++ is a continuously differentiable function, z i : X −i → R is a bounded measurable function, and c i ∈ X i . Then it holds that ∇ i v i (x) = w i (x i )∇ i u i (x) for all x ∈ X and i ∈ N . Since a mapping x → (−∇ i u i (x)) i∈N is strictly monotone, so is a mapping x → (−∇ i v i (x)/w i (x i )) i∈N . This implies that the γ-weighted payoff gradient of v is strictly monotone with γ i (x i ) = 1/w i (x i ) for all x i ∈ N and i ∈ N . Therefore, not only u but also v have a unique correlated equilibrium by Proposition 5. For example, assume that min X i > 0 and let w i (x i ) = x i for all x i ∈ X i and i ∈ N . Then (10) is rewritten as
Furthermore, let u i (x) = −∂f i (x)/∂x i and z i (x −i ) = f i (c i , x −i ) for all x ∈ X and i ∈ N where f i : X → R is a twice continuously differentiable function. Then, (11) is rewritten as
One possible interpretation is that x i ∈ X i is a quantity of a good consumed by player i, f i (x) is player i's benefit of consumption where there exists a consumption externality, and x i (∂f i (x)/∂x i ) is player i's consumption expenditure where the price of the good is set at the marginal benefit of consumption and player i knows that the price depends upon the choice of x i . Note that, in the game v, each player chooses his consumption to maximize the benefit minus the cost, whereas, in the game u = (−∂f i /∂x i ) i∈N , each player chooses his consumption to minimize the marginal benefit. By Proposition 5, if the payoff gradient of u is strictly monotone then not only u but also v have a unique correlated equilibrium. In the construction of this example, for a game v of which γ-weighted payoff gradient is strictly monotone, there exists a game u of which payoff gradient is strictly monotone such that ∇ i u i (x) = γ i (x i )∇ i v i (x). 11 It should be noted that this is not always true if X i ⊆ R m i with m i ≥ 2: in this case, for given v and γ, there may not exist u such that
11 It can be readily shown that u and v have the same best-response correspondence. See Morris and Ui (2004) .
